Published posthumously in 1969, Thirteen Days by Robert F. Kennedy remains an essential text of the Cold War. A firsthand account of the Cuban Missile Crisis by one of the key participants, RFK's memoir presents a sober and eloquent account. Even though he keeps a lot close to his vest, there's enough there for an impression of the decision-making process during the crisis. Devoted to the memory of his brother President Kennedy, the portrait presented here is a model of steady, but cautious leadership, at a moment when history stood at a precipice.
From October 16-29, 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union nearly went to war. After a U-2 reconnaissance plane discovered Soviet missiles were being deployed in Cuba, 90 miles off the coast of Florida, the Kennedy administration faced its greatest test. JFK's inner circle, uncertain of Soviet intentions, were determined to find a way of removing the missiles without resorting to war. Political considerations also factored into their response, knowing if they failed to show resolve it would unravel the administration and embolden its adversaries.
Thirteen Days presents a taut narrative of crisis management. The informal committee known as "Ex-Comm" consisting of cabinet members and advisors who argued and debated the proper courses of action. RFK describes how the initial talks debated whether to take immediate military action through aerial bombing and eventual ground invasion, or whether to order a blockade to buy time for a diplomatic solution. While the "quarantine" approach opened the administration to accusations of looking weak, it was a middle course between belligerence and appeasement. RFK wrote:
That kind of pressure does strange things to a human being, even to brilliant, self-confident, mature, experienced men. For some it brings out characteristics and strengths that perhaps they never knew they had, and for others the pressure is too overwhelming (35).
RFK deftly evokes the moments of intense uncertainty, allowing the reader space to imagine the weight of making historical decisions. As fatigue sets in, one will change their mind quickly, change their tune in front of the president, or even become fatalistic or depressed. President Kennedy followed a strategy of preparing for the worst, while keeping options open for a solution. In this specific crisis - it worked. The eventual diplomatic solution, a U.S. promise not to invade Cuba and eventual removal of missiles in Turkey in return for the Soviets removing the missiles in Cuba, was handled discreetly by both sides.
When one considers all the variables that could've gone wrong its head spinning. Thirteen Days only suggests all the factors in play. Military personnel could make mistakes in the heat of the moment or misinterpret orders. For example, the case of the Soviet submarine officer who prevented a nuclear launch. Luck certainly played a huge role, but rational thinking also prevailed.
Yet the Cuban Missile Crisis continues to raise tantalizing questions. Should nuclear brinksmanship be considered a crime against humanity? RFK recounts his brother worrying about all the innocents who would die in a war. A war for what - credibility? I get the sense all the actors involved at least subconsciously grasped the absurdity of it all - it comes through in Khrushchev's letters he sent to Kennedy.
If there was a takeaway, it was empathy:
The final lesson of the Cuban Missile Crisis is the importance of placing ourselves in the other country's shoes. During the crisis, President Kennedy spent more time trying to determine the effect of a particular course of action on Khrushchev or the Russians than on any other phase of what he was doing. What guided all his deliberations was an effort not to disgrace Khrushchev, not to humiliate the Soviet Union, not to have them feel they would have to escalate their response because their national security or national interests so committed them (95).
Decades later the archives have been opened and all the minute details of the crisis are available. Thirteen Days is now considered more mythmaking than history. No one's going to argue political memoirs are not self-serving, RFK was more hawkish than he led on, but the memoir clearly values diplomacy above brinksmanship, and suggests things were messier than the streamlined narrative presented. Thirteen Days serves as a starting point for studying the crisis (also a quick read), more books on the crisis will be reviewed in the future.
(The 1999 Norton Paperback includes documents and additional historical commentary.)
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