Monday, July 25, 2022

Book Review: Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet by James Mann


The tragic consequences of post-9/11 foreign policy on American institutions and international relations that came in the wake of the attacks continues to loom as an indicator of what led to the current moment. Rise of the Vulcans, published in 2004, tells the origin story of how post- 9/11 foreign policy was shaped and articulated by its framers long before the event that spurred it. The author James Mann was a longtime foreign correspondent for the Los Angeles Times and later a Senior Fellow at the School of Advanced General Studies at Johns Hopkins. Mann's engaging writing style deals eloquently with the biographical details of the key figures and the ideological battles within the foreign policy establishment, making it an essential read dealing with recent history.

The central figures in the book are Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Colin Powell, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Armitage, and Condoleezza Rice. Powell and Armitage were both Vietnam veterans and career military men in charge of the State Department during the first Bush administration. Cheney and Rumsfeld were two professional politicians with lifelong ambitions for the presidency who built their reputations during the Nixon-Ford years. Rice and Wolfowitz were both academics, intellectual advocates of American hegemony across the globe. All came together during the 2000 Bush campaign, jokingly and eventually with seriousness referred themselves as Vulcans in honor of the Roman god of fire, in honor of the sense of "toughness" and "durability" it conveyed. Mann summarized their approach to foreign policy as such: 

The vision was that of an unchallengeable America, a United States whose military power was so awesome that it no longer needed to make compromises or accommodations (unless it chose to do so) with any other nation or groups of countries (xii).

Mann also contends that there's far more overlap between cold war and post-cold war history. The "end of history" narrative that took hold after 1989-1991 was wishful thinking above at best. In fact, it was Cold War triumphalism and the rhetoric of victory surrounding it that led to the disasters to come in the 21st Century. Colin Powell was an outlier, his experiences in Vietnam led him to believe military force should only be used when absolutely necessary, and if used, with overwhelming magnitude to ensure a quick conflict (The Powell Doctrine). His experience as Head of the Joint Chiefs during the First Persian Gulf War (and the December 1989 invasion of Panama) vindicated his defense philosophy, but others thought differently. 

Cheney, Rumsfeld, and Wolfowitz developed their philosophy during the debates over détente during the 1970s. Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger pursued a lessening of tensions with the Soviet Union and China in pursuit of a balance of power to stabilize foreign relations after the Vietnam War. While Kissinger remains a pariah, despised by the political left for his disregard of human rights and by the right who viewed détente as weak, emboldening the USSR. Cheney (Chief of Staff) and Rumsfeld (Defense Secretary) both rose quickly in the Ford administration and worked to undercut Kissinger's realist approach. They pushed for more military spending and aggressive defense postures, both anti-communist and willing to ally with authoritarians when it served their purposes. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the Vulcans were against the so called "peace dividend" of lower defense spending/more social services spending and envisioned a newer and sleeker military no power on the planet would ever consider challenging (once again a misreading of history on their part). 

Only the last 50 or 60 pages is devoted to the response to 9/11, which the Vulcans used to reconfigure foreign policy in their own image. As time would tell the new approach would entail pre-emptive wars, small scale interventions in various hotspots, and eventually torture and violating international law and norms. Neoconservatives like Wolfowitz (liberals who were hawkish on defense) viewed the military as instrument to spread democracy even if it met partnering with tyrannical regimes, a dilemma that confronted policymakers during and after the Cold War.

The invasion of Afghanistan in October of 2001 shortly after the 9/11 attacks overthrew the Taliban by December but failed to capture Osama Bin Laden who escaped into the mountains of Pakistan until his demise in 2011. Instead, the U.S. stumbled into a 20-year occupation, maintaining control of the major cities but facing relentless guerilla war in the countryside and eventual retreat in 2021.

Saddam Hussein was viewed as a longtime nemesis by the Vulcans for many reasons. Even though Iraq had nothing to so with 9/11, Bush's war cabinet used the attacks as pretext to overthrow the regime. Powell convinced the President Bush (41) to end the first Persian Gulf War after four days of ground combat, allowing Hussein to remain in power, the reasoning being an American occupation of Iraq would be too costly and disruptive to the region. Cheney and Rumsfeld saw it differently, they were concerned about Iraq obtaining nuclear weapons and in a grand strategic sense believed a democracy taking root in Iraq would spread throughout the region. Of course, access to oil figured greatly into the calculation. Mann makes clear that losing access to Persian Gulf oil reserves terrified the defense establishment and dominated their thinking.  

The character sketches are astute. Rice grew up in segregated Alabama and went to college on a music scholarship and was welcomed into the foreign policy establishment. A Russian specialist, Ms. Rice became Bush's most trusted adviser, often serving as a mediator between warring factions in his administration. Cheney was a ruthless bureaucrat able to neutralize anyone who crossed him, a believer in a strong Presidency and using the military as a blunt instrument (he got five deferments during the Vietnam era draft earning him the "chickenhawk" sobriquet). The book reveals Cheney oversaw "continuity of power" exercises as a Congressional representative during the 1980s, managing nuclear attack drills with the purpose of saving the government's leadership, a fact he never mentioned while he was Vice President (he famously took over the government on 9/11 for at least a few hours).

Rumsfeld also mastered bureaucratic warfare and was mentored by Nixon. As Secretary of Defense for Bush Jr. he was a media darling for a time due to his pithy press conferences (later tarnished over his torture memos). Wolfowitz, an academic well versed on nuclear and energy policy, became the face of pre-emptive war as a legit policy. During the 1970s he was ahead of the curve, writing academic papers arguing the Persian Gulf should have priority over Western Europe because oil was the key to global dominance (the not so hidden agenda of the Bush years.) Armitage and Powell were both ambivalent about preemptive war, they pushed for a diplomatic solution with Iraq but were undercut by Cheney, Powell would later disgrace himself at the United Nations for his mawkish plea to invade Iraq on faulty evidence. 

The post 9/11 foreign policies relied less on alliances and diplomacy and more on a misguided and tragic belief that America was best to go it alone. As the Iraq War turned into a bloody insurgency, hubris became the most used word to describe the Bush administration. Decisions to wield the full force of the surveillance state in the name of preventing terrorist attacks, detain suspected terrorists without regard for basic human rights, and encourage American citizens to keep shopping as an act of patriotism while requiring members of the armed services to serve endless tours overseas did not leave these leaders in good stead. Rise of the Vulcans does an excellent job of telling the why and how, ultimately becoming a story of how entrenched beliefs serve as limitation rather than a strength, especially with individuals in charge of national security.

I next plan to review Reign of Terror: How the 9/11 era Destabilized America and Produced Trump by journalist Spencer Ackerman. Ackerman spent 20 years covering the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Reign of Terror looks at how Bush era policies mutated domestic politics, the "War on Terror" rhetoric would be weaponized by the Trump movement against fellow Americans they came to view as the real enemy. 

Mann, James. Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet. New York: Penguin, 2004.


Saturday, July 2, 2022

On Boomer Gatekeeping


Today I tried to engage with someone (a baby boomer) expressing their annoyance with Progressives criticizing them for using the "ok boomer" line (a phrase I never use here or in RL). When pointing out some reasons on why the anger exists, I was told to "stop generalizing" and that I didn't know what I was talking about and then unfollowed. This was by someone always posting about how "liberal" they supposedly are. I was only trying to discuss the issue (hoarding wealth, electing Reagan, Trump etc . .) Many people I admire and been inspired by are part of the b generation. Many fought the good fight, but why not discuss where things went wrong instead of taking the criticism personally? The generations to follow will face austerity, fascism and living under threats of militarized violence, nuclear proliferation, climate disaster, deadly new viruses, and god knows what else. Not sure there's a point to any of this. My aim was simply to engage and point out why the anger exists and maybe encourage some introspection, but instead got a dismissive attitude. The young have strong reason to be angry and terrified about what's to come.

A few useful articles on the subject:

https://www.nbcnews.com/better/lifestyle/ok-boomer-diving-generation-what-does-it-mean-ncna1077261

https://www.salon.com/2020/08/25/ok-boomer-millennial-economy-jill-filipovic-salon-talk/