Published in 1995, The Cold War: History by Martin Walker, veteran journalist for the Guardian and many other outlets, wrote a one-volume history of the era. Written at a time when the Cold War was just starting to be thought of as history, the book offers a mostly balanced overview. Walker does an admirable job of placing five decades of history into a coherent narrative, balancing many viewpoints that went into policymaking, while providing a global perspective.
Walker is less concerned with personalities or ideology and more with economics and long-term policy outcomes. Ultimately, the Cold War was a matter of which economy performed better:
The West prevailed because its economy proved able to supply guns as well as butter, aircraft carriers and private cars, rockets as well as foreign holidays for an ever-increasing proportion of taxpayers (1-2)
A "synergy" between free enterprise and state investment in the West proved an essential in spurring economic growth and innovation, everything from massive investments in higher education after Sputnik to the construction of the Interstate highway system benefitted national security and long-term prosperity. Fostering the trading blocs of Western Europe and Japan also brought long-term dividends. The irony of Germany and Japan being the Axis Powers who waged the Second World War ended up being close Allies of the West speaks to the many contradictions and illusions of the post-war world.
An insight I gained from the book was how our perception of reality, especially when caught in the daily grind of crisis and response, can mislead anyone into short-sighted decisions. While I have little background in theory when it comes to international relations, knowing the interests and fears of the other side, and being realistic about your own objectives are critical while navigating crisis. Policies and decisions based on fear and paranoia can lead to extreme and even fatal miscalculations. Walker tracks how each side learned to coexist in the distrustful climate where disaster always loomed.
At the Yalta Conference in February of 1945, arguably the first superpower summit, each side had their own ideas about the post-war world. The United States, under the idealism of FDR, wanted to foster democracy and ensure self-determination, guided by the United Nations. The Soviets wanted long-term security above all else after four years of bearing the brunt of defeating Germany. Allowing the Soviets satellite states in Eastern Europe was anathema to the Americans who worried the Soviets might conquer all of Europe. The clash in objectives and ideologies between the two superpowers inevitably led to conflict.
Anti-communists in the West were convinced the Soviets were bent on world domination, while the Soviet leadership believed the West were imperialists scheming to enforce capitalism on the world. With each side believing the other wants world domination, conflict appears inevitable, and yet something else happened, in time the two sides established rules of conduct. History bears out the truth of both projections, the Soviets did force totalitarianism on Eastern Europe, while the United States often fostered authoritarian regimes under the guise of anti-communism.
Nuclear weapons were crucial in the calculus of every crisis. Truman's decision to use atomic weapons against Japan ended the war but also moved the world into a new stage of existential crisis, the next conflict would far worse. During the brief window when America had a monopoly on atomic weapons, it pursued a policy of secrecy and leverage. Once the Soviets had their own arsenal, each side could destroy each other many times over, crisis management became a means of survival. In the many nuclear clashes of the 1950s, culminating with the Cuban Missile Crisis in October of 1962, it was essential for each side to know what they were and were not willing to concede, added with the underlying assurance neither side desired a nuclear exchange.
The second half of the book views the latter decades of the Cold War as both superpowers discovered the limits of their power, whether it came to leveraging Allies or Quixotic attempts to achieve military superiority through fantastical technology. The age of detente which lasted through the 1970s, saw many changes, most of them positive. Both sides talked with regular frequency, engaging in arms control talks and cultural exchanges. European nations were starting to look beyond the trappings of the Cold War, whether it was East and West Germany moving towards unification, the French leading the way in creating the European Union. China began to engage, and Japan's economic achievements were the envy of the world.
Geopolitical and domestic politics led to new frictions between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. during the 1980s, as the scramble for oil and markets and heightened rhetoric threatened to rip apart the fragile peace. Yet there were signs the Soviet system was in decay, while Reagan's high defense spending led to deficits for the American economy. As Walker suggests, it might be something close to a miracle, the pressures on both nations during the late stages of the Cold War never boiled over. Reagan and Gorbachev both dismissed the hardliners in their midst and allowed the nuclear terror to dissipate - for a brief time anyway. The fall of the Berlin Wall and collapse of the Soviet served as more symbolic rather than concrete signs the travails of the Cold War were of the past; it was more of a respite and hardly an "end to history."
Walker packs his narrative with economic data, charting the long-term and short-term consequences of policy decisions made by all the players. Government involvement in everyday life, whether in the form of defense, education, or social services, maintained a cohesion towards social democracy, especially in Western Europe, while America began to scale back the welfare state and increasingly resort to military intervention. Ultimately end of the Cold War led to a new litany of complex problems which left many nostalgic for the old days of Checkpoint Charlie and fallout shelters.
Although written within the fragile euphoria of the 1990s while not having access to the archives which have opened since, Walker raises perceptive questions and approaches old questions from fresh angles.
Walker, Martin, The Cold War: A History. New York: Holt, 1995.