Reading Through War #3: Gambling with Armageddon - Martin J. Sherwin

In retrospect the Cuban Missile Crisis reminds us of the fragility of decision-making systems under extreme pressure. Gambling With Armageddon avoids the mythmaking that many of President Kennedy's group of advisors, given the futuristic name "Ex-Comm", were cool rationalists. At certain points every member pushed for an invasion of Cuba, which had a high probability of triggering a chain reaction leading to nuclear catastrophe. Everyone was prepared for war and seemingly made their own peace with that decision.

The political pressures of the Cold War led to the existential moment of the crisis. Kennedy and his advisors always had domestic politics on their minds, any hint that concessions were made must never see the light of day. Khruschev insisted the missiles placed in Turkey and Europe were like a loaded gun to the head of the Soviet Union, placing missiles in Cuba reciprocated the feeling for Americans.  Khruschev got the missiles out of Turkey and secured the long-term survival of Castro. Kennedy got the missiles out of Cuba and salvaged his legacy as a master of managing a crisis.

The crisis also showed how technology limited the actions of both sides. In a compressed time frame, each side had to consider their options and possible consequences. A nuclear exchange would destroy civilization, nullifying all human achievements. Sherwin contends we got lucky and still live on borrowed time. If even the most rational individuals barely dodged a bullet, what if unbalanced or delusional minds are in control? 

The 1951 film The Day the Earth Stood Still ends with an alien intelligence warning humanity they might have to intervene if Earth continues its self-destructive path, which is oddly comforting, a superintelligence protecting us from ourselves. But no insurance policy against nuclear war exists, we are stuck with ourselves. 

Sherwin credits political cartoonist Herb Block to summing up the crisis best.

Reading Through War #2: Gambling with Armageddon - Martin J. Sherwin

Martin Sherwin's analysis of the lead up to the Cuban Missile Crisis traces the evolution of nuclear policy through the Truman (1945-53) and Eisenhower (1953-61) administrations. Truman viewed atomic weapons as a superweapon of last resort. While the use of atomic bombs was always on the table, during the Korean War (1950-53) they were never used.  

Eisenhower's election brought major changes. Ike wanted atomic bombs to be the basis of defense policy, in what became known as the New Look. Known for his poker skills since he was a cadet at West Point, Eisenhower decided to go all in on nuclear weapons. The budget would go towards building more bombs, the idea was to get more bang for the buck by relying less on conventional weapons and a large standing army. During a crisis, nuclear saber rattling would get everyone in line. But the approach proved unwieldy. 

Along with Secretary of State John Fosters Dulles, Eisenhower spoke in private about breaking the taboo of using atomic weapons (80). But when push came to shove, the policy tended to limit options. Was using nuclear weapons over the Taiwan Straits or relieving the French in Vietnam wise? Humane? Waving the nuclear stick never got the desired effect, and it made the Soviets more paranoid, so they increased their production of bombs. 

Kennedy's election in 1960 upset Eisenhower, he believed JFK was too weak and inexperienced for the job. Flexible response became the byword of the New Frontier, a recalibration of defense policy, one more versatile and adapted to counter-insurgency strategy. JFK also wanted more engagement with the Soviet Union. But his campaign rhetoric about missile gaps trapped him into continuing the arms race, and he was determined to stay on the right of Nixon on foreign policy - partly I suspect a reaction to McCarthyism. 

During all the strategizing, personal diplomacy became an important subplot of the Cold War. Fidel Castro became ruler of Cuba in January of 1959, and in April he visited the United States. He made a whirlwind tour of speaking engagements and TV appearances. Non-committal on the Cold War, he continually denied being a Marxist, and instead focused on agricultural reform and restoring prosperity to Cuba. He spent three hours with Nixon, Eisenhower skipped town because he loathed any Latin American leader not fiercely anti-communist, Nixon's assessment of him was surprisingly canny. 

In September, the Premier Khruschev also visited America. He met with Ike at Camp David, visited Hollywood and was charmed by starlets Shirley Maclaine and Marilyn Monroe, was denied entry to Disneyland, spent time in Iowa with farmers to study their methods. There were moments of humor and tension, many Americans resented his presence; perhaps many felt hope. These moments were important in small ways, and perhaps bigger ways in the long run.

Khruschev meets with farmers in Iowa.

Sherwin's generous towards Kennedy, an idealist-realist who wanted to reduce tensions. He wrote: 

John Kennedy may have been raised in an overly protected environment, but he lived in a body that tortured him daily, constantly threatened his life, and formed the pillars of his character (168). 

But competing interests in his inner and outer circles fostered maddening complexities. Sherwin suggests Eisenhower worked to sabotage Kennedy, maneuvering him into allowing the CIA to proceed with their coup attempt on Castro. The CIA openly lied to Kennedy about the Bay of Pigs invasion, promising a foreign policy coup. The embarrassing failure damaged his administration and led him to distrust much of the national security apparatus. 

There's the sense of a President lost in labyrinths, he kept his own council and trusted few. Kennedy faced adversaries on multiple fronts from interests in the business community, national security, factions among his advisors - and within himself. The Kennedy years play like a paranoid thriller. 

Reading Through War #1: Gambling with Armageddon - Martin J. Sherwin

Martin J. Sherwin, co-author of the Pulitzer Prize winning Robert Oppenheimer biography American Prometheus, wrote a follow-up in 2020 Gambling with Armageddon: Nuclear Roulette from Hiroshima to the Cuban Missile Crisis. This work traces the decisions that led to the most dangerous moment of the Cold War. 

Existential in approach, the book begins with Soviet submarine Captain Vasily Arkhipov's decision to rescind an order to fire a nuclear armed torpedo at the U.S. fleet blockading Cuba. The world stood 30 seconds away from self-destruction. After all the machinations of political and military leaders since Hiroshima, every move and countermove on the global chessboard, it all came down to one person's refusal. 

Sherwin suggests it was pure luck that prevented a nuclear holocaust in October of 1962, and not the cautious maneuverings of JFK nor the latent humanism of Khruschev. While each leader held the hardliners in their inner circles in check, during the fateful final days of the crisis things were starting to spiral beyond their control. 

Sherwin relates the glee of President Truman at the Potsdam Conference when he learned of the successful Alamogordo test of the atomic bomb. As one of his cabinet officials observed, the U.S. now held a royal flush. Many in the national security apparatus believed the bomb gave America overwhelming leverage over the Soviets. The atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were, in part, a warning to the Soviets. But things did not go as planned. The Soviets began their own crash program to build their own bomb, experts in America estimated it would take them 20 years, but it only took four. It was short-sighted to believe the nuclear monopoly would last decades.

In the immediate aftermath of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Truman administration debated whether to share atomic technology with the Soviets as a sign of good faith to their war ally, as outgoing Secretary of War Henry Stimson told Truman, the weapon was "a first step in a new control by man over the forces of nature too revolutionary and dangerous to fit into old concepts." (67). From the Soviet perspective, decimated by their war with Germany and knowing their new geopolitical rival had a superweapon, the situation looked bleak. The Soviet paranoia is understandable with a thought experiment on how America would react in a similar situation. 

Imagine if China or India made a breakthrough in AI, like a massive missile shield to protect against any attack. Or a cyberwar system that could disarm all the nuclear weapons of their adversaries. How would other nations react in a world where deterrence has broken down? In America there would be panic and finger pointing, a major readjustment of priorities. Whether a nation would reveal such a game-changing breakthrough is separate question. In a world where post-war diplomatic norms are eroding, one can only imagine mass chaos and confusion. 

A lesson from 1945 is that any major technical advance will destabilize, inflame paranoia, and foster distrust. The psychological vulnerability that comes with geopolitical or technological shocks is a factor that is hard to quantify. As we see every day, the effect of technology on human psyche is rarely considered by the tech giants (or maybe they do, which is even more nefarious).

H.G. Wells observed civilization is in a race between education and catastrophe. At a moment when the purpose of education itself is being questioned, that observation feels newly relevant. The shocks are not going away. Preparing for them - psychologically and morally - may be the central challenge of this century. The humanities can provide guidance - if we choose to keep them. 
 

 

Book Review: The Cold War: A History by Martin Walker

Published in 1995, The Cold War: History by Martin Walker, veteran journalist for the Guardian and many other outlets, wrote a one-volume history of the era. Written at a time when the Cold War was just starting to be thought of as history, the book offers a mostly balanced overview. Walker does an admirable job of placing five decades of history into a coherent narrative, balancing many viewpoints that went into policymaking, while providing a global perspective. 

Walker is less concerned with personalities or ideology and more with economics and long-term policy outcomes. Ultimately, the Cold War was a matter of which economy performed better:

The West prevailed because its economy proved able to supply guns as well as butter, aircraft carriers and private cars, rockets as well as foreign holidays for an ever-increasing proportion of taxpayers (1-2)

A "synergy" between free enterprise and state investment in the West proved an essential in spurring economic growth and innovation, everything from massive investments in higher education after Sputnik to the construction of the Interstate highway system benefitted national security and long-term prosperity. Fostering the trading blocs of Western Europe and Japan also brought long-term dividends. The irony of Germany and Japan being the Axis Powers who waged the Second World War ended up being close Allies of the West speaks to the many contradictions and illusions of the post-war world.

An insight I gained from the book was how our perception of reality, especially when caught in the daily grind of crisis and response, can mislead anyone into short-sighted decisions. While I have little background in theory when it comes to international relations, knowing the interests and fears of the other side, and being realistic about your own objectives are critical while navigating crisis. Policies and decisions based on fear and paranoia can lead to extreme and even fatal miscalculations. Walker tracks how each side learned to coexist in the distrustful climate where disaster always loomed. 

At the Yalta Conference in February of 1945, arguably the first superpower summit, each side had their own ideas about the post-war world. The United States, under the idealism of FDR, wanted to foster democracy and ensure self-determination, guided by the United Nations. The Soviets wanted long-term security above all else after four years of bearing the brunt of defeating Germany. Allowing the Soviets satellite states in Eastern Europe was anathema to the Americans who worried the Soviets might conquer all of Europe. The clash in objectives and ideologies between the two superpowers inevitably led to conflict. 

Anti-communists in the West were convinced the Soviets were bent on world domination, while the Soviet leadership believed the West were imperialists scheming to enforce capitalism on the world. With each side believing the other wants world domination, conflict appears inevitable, and yet something else happened, in time the two sides established rules of conduct. History bears out the truth of both projections, the Soviets did force totalitarianism on Eastern Europe, while the United States often fostered authoritarian regimes under the guise of anti-communism. 

Nuclear weapons were crucial in the calculus of every crisis. Truman's decision to use atomic weapons against Japan ended the war but also moved the world into a new stage of existential crisis, the next conflict would far worse. During the brief window when America had a monopoly on atomic weapons, it pursued a policy of secrecy and leverage. Once the Soviets had their own arsenal, each side could destroy each other many times over, crisis management became a means of survival. In the many nuclear clashes of the 1950s, culminating with the Cuban Missile Crisis in October of 1962, it was essential for each side to know what they were and were not willing to concede, added with the underlying assurance neither side desired a nuclear exchange. 

The second half of the book views the latter decades of the Cold War as both superpowers discovered the limits of their power, whether it came to leveraging Allies or Quixotic attempts to achieve military superiority through fantastical technology. The age of detente which lasted through the 1970s, saw many changes, most of them positive. Both sides talked with regular frequency, engaging in arms control talks and cultural exchanges. European nations were starting to look beyond the trappings of the Cold War, whether it was East and West Germany moving towards unification, the French leading the way in creating the European Union. China began to engage, and Japan's economic achievements were the envy of the world.

Geopolitical and domestic politics led to new frictions between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. during the 1980s, as the scramble for oil and markets and heightened rhetoric threatened to rip apart the fragile peace. Yet there were signs the Soviet system was in decay, while Reagan's high defense spending led to deficits for the American economy. As Walker suggests, it might be something close to a miracle, the pressures on both nations during the late stages of the Cold War never boiled over. Reagan and Gorbachev both dismissed the hardliners in their midst and allowed the nuclear terror to dissipate - for a brief time anyway. The fall of the Berlin Wall and collapse of the Soviet served as more symbolic rather than concrete signs the travails of the Cold War were of the past; it was more of a respite and hardly an "end to history." 

Walker packs his narrative with economic data, charting the long-term and short-term consequences of policy decisions made by all the players. Government involvement in everyday life, whether in the form of defense, education, or social services, maintained a cohesion towards social democracy, especially in Western Europe, while America began to scale back the welfare state and increasingly resort to military intervention. Ultimately end of the Cold War led to a new litany of complex problems which left many nostalgic for the old days of Checkpoint Charlie and fallout shelters. 

Although written within the fragile euphoria of the 1990s while not having access to the archives which have opened since, Walker raises perceptive questions and approaches old questions from fresh angles. 

Walker, Martin, The Cold War: A History. New York: Holt, 1995.

Book Review: Fascism: A Warning by Madeleine Albright

Fascism: A Warning by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright provides a history of fascism and explains its recent resurgence for a popular audience. Written in response to the early Trump administration, Albright combines political memoir with historical analysis, drawing connections to current events and government actions that should raise concern. The book's main purpose is educational, directed towards readers who did not live through the 20th Century. 

Albright defines a Fascist as:

someone who identifies strongly with and claims to speak for a whole nation or group, is unconcerned with the rights of others, and is willing to use whatever means are necessary - including violence -to achieve his or her goals. In that conception, a Fascist will likely be a tyrant, but a tyrant need not be a Fascist. (11)

During the rise and eventual election of Trump in 2016, pundits and the political class were reluctant to use the F-word towards MAGA and acted like it was "normal populism." Albright deserves credit for writing honestly about Trump when few from the establishment were willing to say so. Albright also places MAGA within the context of global politics, comparing America with Hungary, Poland, and Turkey. A chapter on the rise of Vladimir Putin places the Russian leader as the setting the template for modern authoritarianism. 

The early chapters focus on the rise of fascism in the 1930s recounting the rise of Mussolini, Hitler, and Franco, focusing on the methods they used to attain power. There are many definitions of fascism from a theoretical perspective, but the signatures remain the same: nationalistic, subservient to a charismatic leader, demonizing minorities for a country's ills, militaristic in rhetoric and foreign policy, and silencing all critics through intimidation. Many scholars have argued Fascism arose in the 20th Century due to industrialism and democracy's failure to adapt. Just as in the 21st Century, democracies have struggled with adjusting to technology and the post-industrial world, leaving many behind who are angry and open to accepting a dictator. 

The book is most effective when explaining how 21st Century authoritarians have turned to more subtle tactics. They utilize social media to provide their followers with their own truths, outflanking legacy media outlets and demonizing experts. All faith is placed in the leader. Trump's ability to build a coalition of Christian nationalists, Tech Bros, and traditional conservatives mocked all the conventional wisdom of the pundit class. 

Albright passed away in 2022, so she did not live to see the reelection of Trump. The political establishment has failed to deal with him, they've been outflanked at every turn. Biden's antiquated brand of post-war liberalism failed to break the MAGA fever. Neither does Albright acknowledge the mixed legacy of the foreign policy establishment or take some responsibility for the conditions that led to Trump. 

Warnings from denizens of American politics are useful from an educational perspective, but it will take new methods to defeat the new fascism. I'm susceptible to WWII nostalgia like anyone else, the democracies managed to build the alliances to preserve their ideals, but those were strategies of a different time. For democracy to survive it will require courage and creativity - if it's not already too late. 

Book Review: Reign of Terror: How the 9/11 Era Destabilized America and Produced Trump by Spencer Ackerman

Spencer Ackerman covered the War on Terror over the past 20 years for The Guardian and other outlets. In Reign of Terror, he argues the post 9/11 era accelerated America's descent into political chaos. The forces of xenophobia and white supremacy reared their head and were mainstreamed into the popular discourse. The aftermath of 9/11 fomented a blowback first felt though interventions abroad and eventually into a deeper reckoning on the home front (or "homeland" to cite the era's rhetorical changes). Reign of Terror is consistently grim but well argued.

The narrative begins with the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, the day a white supremacist blew up the city's Federal Building with a truck bomb. In the immediate aftermath the media suspected Middle Eastern terrorists, but when the bomber turned out to be an average looking white guy Gulf War veteran with ties to the militia movements, indicating dark forces alive and well in the heartland. White supremacy fueled the militia movement, and the bombing was an attempt to make their fantasy of igniting a civil war come to pass. The bomber was allowed to stand trial and enjoy his time in prison with full privileges. Non-white terror suspects would receive far different treatment from the authorities (with the exception of Obama era whistle blower Chelsea Manning)

In the post-9/11 era suspected terrorists were rounded up and sent to Guantanamo Bay, held as enemy combatants, and often denied basic human rights. Torture became standard policy and Ackmerman describes in graphic detail the methods pursued by the CIA and the military. While President Bush was careful (except for a few thinking out loud moments) not to implicate all Muslims as jihadists, the era fueled anti-Islamic attitudes of an increasingly xenophobic voting bloc already enraged over the Mexican border and changing demographics in America. Islamophobia would manifest itself in accusations President Obama was an imposter born in Kenya.

No one gets off free. Conservatives quickly figured out how the war could be used to further their political agendas. Liberals barely put up a defense to the new militarism. Out of fear from looking weak in the face of existential threats, most Democrats supported the Iraq War. The author also criticizes President Obama for missing valuable opportunities to reshape foreign policy and end the War on Terror, but the machinery set by the Bush administration was too entrenched for substantial change. Instead, Obama streamlined and widened the war by stepping up surveillance and the use of drones.

In 2016, candidate Trump condemned America's wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, even prompting some gullible pundits to declare him the "peace candidate" opposite Hillary Clinton (generally considered a hawkish liberal). Trump reveled in violent rhetoric and implied the War on Terror needed to be waged with no constraints whatsoever. He spoke of "secret plans" to defeat Isis and labeled all Muslims as the enemy by calling for a ban on all from entering the country. Even more predictable and disturbing was the new populist talking point: liberals must be considered just as dangerous as Isis, or even worse. 

I recall the unrest in 2014 in Ferguson, Missouri in response to the police killing Michael Brown. It was an early example of a militarized police force being unleashed on protestors who were demanding racial justice. It was the first sign the War on Terror tactics would be waged on American citizens. During the 2020 protests after of George Floyd's murder, Trump and many Republicans wanted to use the military to jail and brutalize protestors. Homeland Security and ICE agents made their presence known and showed little restraint despite being filmed on I-Phones. Meanwhile, the War on Terror rolled on endlessly.

Reign of Terror is bleak, but well-argued and impassioned. The key to Ackerman's main argument goes back to Susan Sontag's reflection on 9/11 that was published in the New Yorker the week after. Instead of calling for retribution and offering banal statements about American perseverance during challenging times, she called out the country's foreign policy in the Middle East as the main cause of the attacks. Pundits on the left and right denounced Sontag. The Bush administration, with bi-partisan and popular support, chose to pursue vengeance and conflict on the Middle East. Any hint of soul searching or a reconsideration of America's relationship with the world that Sontag advocated for were either ignored or silenced. 

Ackerman offers no alternate paths or solutions, and while I try to avoid criticizing a book for what it's not, considering alternate paths or counterfactuals have their use. No one escapes unscathed. Dissenters to the War on Terror are portrayed as ineffectual. The acidic critique of Obama may be warranted at times, but the political realities the administration faced in 2009 made a total halt to all conflicts untenable. As Obama advisor Ben Rhodes pointed out to Ackerman, what if Obama had ended the War on Terror and it was followed by a cataclysmic terror attack - and then what?

Ackerman's also in the complicated place of being critical towards the National Security State and the populist forces Trump unleashed, who see themselves in opposition to the nefarious "deep state."  The subtext was they wished to take over the deep state and install their own loyalists - and according to a recent article they have a plan in place. The distinction should be spelled out more clearly: one is a dangerous, violent, antidemocratic political movement - the other needs institutional reform and more accountability. 

Ultimately, Reign of Terror provides a coherent and passionate perspective on how the War on Terror damaged the world. The level of destruction wrought by American military power wrought on Asia and Africa left a trail of death and suffering in the millions. The militarization of the police and armed insurgency movements pose serious existential threats to democracy's survival. I would recommend Reign of Terror as a must read for some critical insight on the past 20 years.