Reading Through War #2: Gambling with Armageddon - Martin J. Sherwin

Martin Sherwin's analysis of the lead up to the Cuban Missile Crisis traces the evolution of nuclear policy through the Truman (1945-53) and Eisenhower (1953-61) administrations. Truman viewed atomic weapons as a superweapon of last resort. While the use of atomic bombs was always on the table, during the Korean War (1950-53) they were never used.  

Eisenhower's election brought major changes. Ike wanted atomic bombs to be the basis of defense policy, in what became known as the New Look. Known for his poker skills since he was a cadet at West Point, Eisenhower decided to go all in on nuclear weapons. The budget would go towards building more bombs, the idea was to get more bang for the buck by relying less on conventional weapons and a large standing army. During a crisis, nuclear saber rattling would get everyone in line. But the approach proved unwieldy. 

Along with Secretary of State John Fosters Dulles, Eisenhower spoke in private about breaking the taboo of using atomic weapons (80). But when push came to shove, the policy tended to limit options. Was using nuclear weapons over the Taiwan Straits or relieving the French in Vietnam wise? Humane? Waving the nuclear stick never got the desired effect, and it made the Soviets more paranoid, so they increased their production of bombs. 

Kennedy's election in 1960 upset Eisenhower, he believed JFK was too weak and inexperienced for the job. Flexible response became the byword of the New Frontier, a recalibration of defense policy, one more versatile and adapted to counter-insurgency strategy. JFK also wanted more engagement with the Soviet Union. But his campaign rhetoric about missile gaps trapped him into continuing the arms race, and he was determined to stay on the right of Nixon on foreign policy - partly I suspect a reaction to McCarthyism. 

During all the strategizing, personal diplomacy became an important subplot of the Cold War. Fidel Castro became ruler of Cuba in January of 1959, and in April he visited the United States. He made a whirlwind tour of speaking engagements and TV appearances. Non-committal on the Cold War, he continually denied being a Marxist, and instead focused on agricultural reform and restoring prosperity to Cuba. He spent three hours with Nixon, Eisenhower skipped town because he loathed any Latin American leader not fiercely anti-communist, Nixon's assessment of him was surprisingly canny. 

In September, the Premier Khruschev also visited America. He met with Ike at Camp David, visited Hollywood and was charmed by starlets Shirley Maclaine and Marilyn Monroe, was denied entry to Disneyland, spent time in Iowa with farmers to study their methods. There were moments of humor and tension, many Americans resented his presence; perhaps many felt hope. These moments were important in small ways, and perhaps bigger ways in the long run.

Khruschev meets with farmers in Iowa.

Sherwin's generous towards Kennedy, an idealist-realist who wanted to reduce tensions. He wrote: 

John Kennedy may have been raised in an overly protected environment, but he lived in a body that tortured him daily, constantly threatened his life, and formed the pillars of his character (168). 

But competing interests in his inner and outer circles fostered maddening complexities. Sherwin suggests Eisenhower worked to sabotage Kennedy, maneuvering him into allowing the CIA to proceed with their coup attempt on Castro. The CIA openly lied to Kennedy about the Bay of Pigs invasion, promising a foreign policy coup. The embarrassing failure damaged his administration and led him to distrust much of the national security apparatus. 

There's the sense of a President lost in labyrinths, he kept his own council and trusted few. Kennedy faced adversaries on multiple fronts from interests in the business community, national security, factions among his advisors - and within himself. The Kennedy years play like a paranoid thriller.