Tuesday, March 31, 2026

Reading Through War #2: Gambling with Armageddon - Martin J. Sherwin

Martin Sherwin's analysis of the lead up to the Cuban Missile Crisis traces the evolution of nuclear policy through the Truman (1945-53) and Eisenhower (1953-61) administrations. Truman viewed atomic weapons as a superweapon of last resort. While the use of atomic bombs was always on the table, during the Korean War (1950-53) they were never used.  

Eisenhower's election brought major changes. Ike wanted atomic bombs to be the basis of defense policy, in what became known as the New Look. Known for his poker skills since he was a cadet at West Point, Eisenhower decided to go all in on nuclear weapons. The budget would go towards building more bombs, the idea was to get more bang for the buck by relying less on conventional weapons and a large standing army. During a crisis, nuclear saber rattling would get everyone in line. But the approach proved unwieldy. 

Along with Secretary of State John Fosters Dulles, Eisenhower spoke in private about breaking the taboo of using atomic weapons (80). But when push came to shove, the policy tended to limit options. Was using nuclear weapons over the Taiwan Straits or relieving the French in Vietnam wise? Humane? Waving the nuclear stick never got the desired effect, and it made the Soviets more paranoid, so they increased their production of bombs. 

Kennedy's election in 1960 upset Eisenhower, he believed JFK was too weak and inexperienced for the job. Flexible response became the byword of the New Frontier, a recalibration of defense policy, one more versatile and adapted to counter-insurgency strategy. JFK also wanted more engagement with the Soviet Union. But his campaign rhetoric about missile gaps trapped him into continuing the arms race, and he was determined to stay on the right of Nixon on foreign policy - partly I suspect a reaction to McCarthyism. 

During all the strategizing, personal diplomacy became an important subplot of the Cold War. Fidel Castro became ruler of Cuba in January of 1959, and in April he visited the United States. He made a whirlwind tour of speaking engagements and TV appearances. Non-committal on the Cold War, he continually denied being a Marxist, and instead focused on agricultural reform and restoring prosperity to Cuba. He spent three hours with Nixon, Eisenhower skipped town because he loathed any Latin American leader not fiercely anti-communist, Nixon's assessment of him was surprisingly canny. 

In September, the Premier Khruschev also visited America. He met with Ike at Camp David, visited Hollywood and was charmed by starlets Shirley Maclaine and Marilyn Monroe, was denied entry to Disneyland, spent time in Iowa with farmers to study their methods. There were moments of humor and tension, many Americans resented his presence; perhaps many felt hope. These moments were important in small ways, and perhaps bigger ways in the long run.

Khruschev meets with farmers in Iowa.

Sherwin's generous towards Kennedy, an idealist-realist who wanted to reduce tensions. He wrote: 

John Kennedy may have been raised in an overly protected environment, but he lived in a body that tortured him daily, constantly threatened his life, and formed the pillars of his character (168). 

But competing interests in his inner and outer circles fostered maddening complexities. Sherwin suggests Eisenhower worked to sabotage Kennedy, maneuvering him into allowing the CIA to proceed with their coup attempt on Castro. The CIA openly lied to Kennedy about the Bay of Pigs invasion, promising a foreign policy coup. The embarrassing failure damaged his administration and led him to distrust much of the national security apparatus. 

There's the sense of a President lost in labyrinths, he kept his own council and trusted few. Kennedy faced adversaries on multiple fronts from interests in the business community, national security, factions among his advisors - and within himself. The Kennedy years play like a paranoid thriller. 

Thursday, March 26, 2026

Reading Through War #1: Gambling with Armageddon - Martin J. Sherwin

Martin J. Sherwin, co-author of the Pulitzer Prize winning Robert Oppenheimer biography American Prometheus, wrote a follow-up in 2020 Gambling with Armageddon: Nuclear Roulette from Hiroshima to the Cuban Missile Crisis. This work traces the decisions that led to the most dangerous moment of the Cold War. 

Existential in approach, the book begins with Soviet submarine Captain Vasily Arkhipov's decision to rescind an order to fire a nuclear armed torpedo at the U.S. fleet blockading Cuba. The world stood 30 seconds away from self-destruction. After all the machinations of political and military leaders since Hiroshima, every move and countermove on the global chessboard, it all came down to one person's refusal. 

Sherwin suggests it was pure luck that prevented a nuclear holocaust in October of 1962, and not the cautious maneuverings of JFK nor the latent humanism of Khruschev. While each leader held the hardliners in their inner circles in check, during the fateful final days of the crisis things were starting to spiral beyond their control. 

Sherwin relates the glee of President Truman at the Potsdam Conference when he learned of the successful Alamogordo test of the atomic bomb. As one of his cabinet officials observed, the U.S. now held a royal flush. Many in the national security apparatus believed the bomb gave America overwhelming leverage over the Soviets. The atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were, in part, a warning to the Soviets. But things did not go as planned. The Soviets began their own crash program to build their own bomb, experts in America estimated it would take them 20 years, but it only took four. It was short-sighted to believe the nuclear monopoly would last decades.

In the immediate aftermath of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Truman administration debated whether to share atomic technology with the Soviets as a sign of good faith to their war ally, as outgoing Secretary of War Henry Stimson told Truman, the weapon was "a first step in a new control by man over the forces of nature too revolutionary and dangerous to fit into old concepts." (67). From the Soviet perspective, decimated by their war with Germany and knowing their new geopolitical rival had a superweapon, the situation looked bleak. The Soviet paranoia is understandable with a thought experiment on how America would react in a similar situation. 

Imagine if China or India made a breakthrough in AI, like a massive missile shield to protect against any attack. Or a cyberwar system that could disarm all the nuclear weapons of their adversaries. How would other nations react in a world where deterrence has broken down? In America there would be panic and finger pointing, a major readjustment of priorities. Whether a nation would reveal such a game-changing breakthrough is separate question. In a world where post-war diplomatic norms are eroding, one can only imagine mass chaos and confusion. 

A lesson from 1945 is that any major technical advance will destabilize, inflame paranoia, and foster distrust. The psychological vulnerability that comes with geopolitical or technological shocks is a factor that is hard to quantify. As we see every day, the effect of technology on human psyche is rarely considered by the tech giants (or maybe they do, which is even more nefarious).

H.G. Wells observed civilization is in a race between education and catastrophe. At a moment when the purpose of education itself is being questioned, that observation feels newly relevant. The shocks are not going away. Preparing for them - psychologically and morally - may be the central challenge of this century. The humanities can provide guidance - if we choose to keep them. 
 

 


Tuesday, March 24, 2026

Master Reading List - War, Literature, & Memory 1900-2024


I wanted to take on an ambitious reading project to bring some life into this blog. The list both predates and goes beyond the Cold War with emphasis on academic history, literature, and memoir.

My goal is not to write formal reviews for each book, but to post general reflections - making connections, raising questions, and keeping the larger picture in view as I go. Ideally, I'll work through the list over the course of a year.

I plan to mostly move in chronological order, though I'm starting in the middle with Gambling with Armageddon by Martin J. Sherwin - an existential study of the Cuban Missile Crisis.


Master Reading List (30 Books): War, Literature, & Memory 1900–2024

I. Pre-1914: Illusion of Stability

  1. The Proud Tower — Barbara Tuchman


II. World War I: Descent into Catastrophe

  1. The Sleepwalkers — Christopher Clark

  2. The Guns of August — Barbara Tuchman

  3. Testament of Youth — Vera Brittain

  4. The Great War and Modern Memory — Paul Fussell


III. Interwar Period: Crisis, Ideology, Collapse

  1. The Lords of Finance — Liaquat Ahamed

  2. Darkness at Noon — Arthur Koestler

  3. Homage to Catalonia — George Orwell

  4. The Gathering Storm — Winston Churchill


IV. World War II: Total War & Moral Extremes

  1. The Coming of the Third Reich (Trilogy) — Richard J. Evans

  2. The Forgotten Soldier — Guy Sajer

  3. Catch-22 — Joseph Heller


V. Holocaust & Civilian Catastrophe

  1. Hiroshima — John Hersey

  2. The True Story of Hansel and Gretel — Louise Murphy

  3. Schindler's List — Thomas Keneally

  4. The Holocaust in American Life — Peter Novick


VI. Cold War & Nuclear Age

  1. Postwar — Tony Judt & To Run the World ----- Sergey Radchenko

  2. The Dead Hand — David E. Hoffman

  3. Gambling with Armageddon — Martin J. Sherwin

  4. Bomb Power — Garry Wills

  5. You Are One of Them — Elliott Holt


VII. Vietnam: Breakdown & Disillusionment

  1. Dispatches — Michael Herr

  2. Going After Cacciato — Tim O’Brien

  3. A Bright Shining Lie — Neil Sheehan

  4. Matterhorn — Karl Marlantes

  5. An Army Afire — Beth Bailey


VIII. Post-Cold War & Contemporary Conflict

  1. Black Hawk Down — Mark Bowden

  2. Redeployment — Phil Klay

  3. The Pentagon's Brain — Annie Jacobsen


IX. Coda: Alternate History / Reflection

  1. The Man in the High Castle — Philip K. Dick