Book Review: Commander and Chief: FDR's Battle With Churchill, 1943 by Nigel Hamilton

Commander in Chief is the second volume of Nigel Hamilton's study of FDR as a grand strategist, the first volume The Mantle of Command focused on the aftermath of Pearl Harbor and the key decisions made by the Allies in 1942, specifically FDR's determination to open a second front in North Africa which led to a confrontation with his generals. As the title suggests, the middle volume takes a close look at FDR and Churchill's clash over war strategy through 1943, specifically whether the Allies were best served by focusing on the Mediterranean front with the eventual goal of overtaking Germany from the south or by opening a front in Western Europe through a cross-channel invasion. Churchill favored the former, while FDR advocated for the latter. 

Hamilton's objective with the trilogy was to compile a narrative of events from FDR's perspective. Much of the discourse around the grand strategy of the war was shaped by Churchill's own six-volume history, which remains invaluable, but must also be recognized as biased and self-serving. From FDR's mindset, recognizing the immediate threat posed by Hitler, while at the same time realizing Stalin was also a monster but an essential ally if the Third Reich would ever be defeated. He worried about the USSR and Germany reaching an armistice that would split the alliance and forever decide the fate of Europe.

But the immediate concern was Churchill's insistence on taking the fight to Hitler through Italy, an idea supported by many in FDR's inner circle. The argument for the Mediterranean strategy was that a cross-channel invasion of France was too risky, Hitler's Atlantic wall would decimate any attempt to land a major invading force. History was on Churchill's side since there had not been a successful cross-channel invasion since 1066. The Dieppe raid in August of 1942 was a small-scale attempt at an amphibious invasion of France by the Allies that ended in disaster. Churchill argued for hitting weak points across Southern Europe to weaken Germany with far less casualties and eventually more leverage in shaping the fate of Europe before the Soviets swept across the entire continent.  

FDR saw it differently and had to play a complicated game of keeping the alliance together while never losing sight of the main goal. He was wise enough to realize preparations for a cross-channel invasion would take time. Many of his generals had favored an attempt in 1942, and many pushed for 1943. From FDR's perspective the situation was far more complex. His military advisors felt landings in North Africa served little purpose in defeating the Axis powers, but FDR saw the importance of engaging German armies to gain experience that would prove pivotal when the time was right for D-Day. Similarly, the July 1943 invasion of Sicily provided experience with amphibious operations. By mid-1943, FDR decided the time for peripheral strategies was over and the invasion of France must move forward the next spring to bring a swift end to the conflict. 

The imperative to ease pressure on the Soviets by forcing Germany to fight on two European fronts cannot be overstated. Churchill fantasized about moving into Italy as a launching point of securing the Balkans. But these "pinprick" operations on the periphery were a way of avoiding the difficult task of defeating the Germans where they were strongest. With the Allied war aim of unconditional surrender, the end could only come with total capitulation, best achieved by landings in France. Churchill also underestimated how fiercely the German army would resist, the Wehrmacht did not collapse after the landings in Italy, and it took the Allies months to secure Rome. By the end of summer 1943, FDR's plan for a cross-channel invasion prevailed, it was the riskiest but surest way to end the war.

Hamilton also lets the reader see things from the German perspective in 1943, although the Soviet invasion had stalled and they had retreated in North Africa, Hitler and the top leadership believed they could drive a wedge into the alliance; confident their domination of Europe was permanent. They welcomed more attacks on the periphery of Europe since they had shorter supply lines and less to lose, and were also confident a cross-channel invasion by the Allies would meet with swift defeat. With fantasies of super weapons and a belief in their national fate, the German leadership in 1943 still saw many paths to victory (or stalemate) despite the recent setbacks. 

Even during the war's darkest moments FDR was planning for the post-war world. He envisioned the United Nations and the end of colonialism (another sore spot with Churchill), creating the structures that would lead to a long peace. If Churchill was the ultimate frenemy, Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King was a close confidante who kept records of his meetings with FDR. I can't imagine what FDR would think of an American President antagonizing Canada (apologies for the contemporary reference.) He also had a gift for recognizing talent, he supported Eisenhower even through his shaky performance during Operation Torch. 

While hundreds of studies have been written on the Second World War, Commander and Chief is a clear-eyed view of 1943 and the challenges facing the Allied leadership. Hamilton's sense of narrative is dramatic, and he avoids pushing personal agendas or engaging in armchair generalship. He sticks to the facts and presents readers with the complexities facing leaders at the highest levels during a pivotal moment of world history.